With the growing interest in LNG in all areas, CH·IV has chosen to document as many LNG "incidents" as possible. These include land-based, LNG ship and over-the-road events. We have also included, when found, misinformation and disinformation on the subject. This has resulted in the publishing of a 20-page document entitled "Safety History of International LNG Operations".

Please contact our Maryland office at hanover@ch-iv.com or our Houston office at houston@ch-iv.com to request a copy of this document. Please state in your request what your interest in LNG is.

Two such incidents are included below:

1. October 1944, Cleveland, Ohio, USA - LNG Peakshaving Facility
The Cleveland Disaster

Any time the topic of LNG is introduced to a new audience, the “Cleveland Disaster” is bound to surface. It was indeed tragic, but a candid review will show just how far the industry has come from that horrific incident. The East Ohio Gas Company built the first “commercial” LNG peakshaving facility in Cleveland, Ohio in 1941. The facility was run without incident until 1944, when a new, larger tank was added. As stainless steel alloys were scarce because of World War II, the new tank was built with low nickel content (3.5%). Shortly after going into service, the tank failed. LNG spilled into the street and storm sewer system. The resultant fire killed 128 people, setting back the embryonic LNG industry substantially. The following is extracted from the U.S. Bureau of Mines report on the incident.

On October 20, 1944, the tanks had been filled to capacity in readiness for the coming winter months. About 2:15PM, the cylindrical tank suddenly failed releasing all of its contents into the nearby streets and sewers of Cleveland. The cloud promptly ignited and a fire ensued which engulfed the nearby tank, residences and commercial establishments. After about 20 minutes, when the initial fire had nearly died down, the sphere nearest to the cylindrical tank toppled over and released its contents. 9,400 gallons of LNG immediately evaporated and ignited. In all, 128 people were killed and 225 injured. The area directly involved was about three-quarters of a square mile of which an area of about 30 acres was completely devastated.

The Bureau of Mines investigation showed that the accident was due to the low temperature embrittlement of the inner shell of the cylindrical tank. The inner tank was made of 3.5% nickel steel, a material now known to be susceptible to brittle fracture at LNG storage temperature ( -260°F). In addition, the tanks were located close to a heavily traveled railroad station and a bombshell stamping plant. Excessive vibration from the railroad engines and stamping presses probably accelerated crack propagation in the inner shell. Once the inner shell ruptured, the outer carbon steel wall would have easily fractured upon contact with LNG. The accident was aggravated by the absence of adequate diking around the tanks, and the proximity of the facility to a residential area. The cause of the second release from the spherical tank was the fact that the legs of the sphere were not insulated against fire so that they eventually buckled after being exposed to direct flame contact.

Further, it should be noted that the ignition of the two unconfined vapor clouds of LNG in Cleveland did not result in explosions. There was no evidence of any explosion overpressures after the ignition of the spill from either the cylindrical tank or the sphere. The only explosions that took place in Cleveland were limited to the sewers where LNG ran and vaporized before the vapor-air mixture ignited in a relatively confined volume. The U.S. Bureau of Mines concluded that the concept of liquefying and storing LNG was valid if “proper precautions are observed”.

2. February 1973, Staten Island, New York, USA

LNG Peakshaving Facility – Construction Accident, no LNG present
The most consistently misreported “LNG Accident”

Proper precautions have been common place in all of the LNG facilities built and placed in service ever since Cleveland. Between the moid-1960s and mid-1970s, more than 60 LNG facilities were built in the United States. These peakshaving plants have had an excellent safety record. This construction accident has consistently been used by opponents of LNG as a case-in-point to depict the danger of LNG. After all, “37 persons lost their lives at an LNG facility”. That’s the hype. This is the story –

One of Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation’s (TETCO) LNG storage tanks in Staten Island had been in service for over three years when it was taken out of service for international repairs. The tank was warmed, purged of the remaining combustible gases with inert nitrogen, and then filled with fresh recirculation air. A construction crew entered the tank to begin repair work in April of 1972. Ten months later, in February 1973, an unknown cause ignited the Mylar liner and polyurethane foam insulation inside the tank. Initial standard operation procedures called for the use of explosion-proof equipment within the tank; however non-explosion proof irons and vacuum cleaners were being used for sealing the liner and cleaning insulation debris. It is assumed that an electrical spark in one of the irons or vacuum cleaners ignited the Mylar liner. The rapid rise in temperature caused a corresponding rise in pressure. The pressure increase lifted the tank’s concrete dome. The dome then collapsed killing the 37 construction workers inside.

The subsequent New York City Fire Department investigation concluded that the accident was clearly a construction accident and not an LNG accident. This has not prevented LNG’s opponents from claiming that since there may have been latent vapors from the heavy components of the LNG that was stored in the tank, then it was in fact an LNG incident